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MURKY PRECEDENT MEETS HAZY AIR: 
THE COMPACT CLAUSE AND THE 
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
Michael S. Smith* 
Abstract: As it becomes clear that global warming is a reality, states are 
increasingly taking measures to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases 
such as carbon dioxide (CO2). These efforts come largely in response to 
the federal government’s failure to regulate CO2 emissions. Perhaps the 
most significant and novel example of states’ efforts to combat this prob-
lem is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a multi-state at-
tempt to establish a regional cap-and-trade program targeting CO2 emis-
sions produced by fossil fuel-fired power plants. RGGI faces significant 
obstacles in its path to full implementation, including the possibility that 
it violates the Compact Clause of Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion. This Note argues that in its current iteration, RGGI likely does not 
conflict with the federal government’s Compact Clause power as deline-
ated by the Supreme Court in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission. 
If RGGI’s administrative body is ultimately vested with greater regulatory 
and enforcement powers, however, this Note concludes that the outcome 
under U.S. Steel could be much different. 
Introduction 
 Global warming is a growing threat, one that humans have an 
interest in addressing promptly and effectively.1 A major cause of the 
alarming rise in global temperatures is the emission of greenhouse 
gases, namely carbon dioxide (CO2), which is emitted in frighteningly 
large quantities by fossil-fuel burning power plants.2 In recent years, 
the second Bush Administration has avoided regulating greenhouse 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
1 See Karen N. Scott, The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean CO2 Sequestration and the Future of 
Climate Change, 18 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 57, 57–58 (2005). 
2 See David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think 
Globally and Act Locally?, 21 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 53, 60–62 (2003); Robert R. Nordhaus & 
Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Program, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 97, 108 (2005). 
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gas emissions.3 In 2001, the Administration rejected the Kyoto Proto-
col, which seeks to establish international standards for the reduction 
of greenhouse gases.4 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
meanwhile, has declined to list CO2 as a criteria pollutant under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA).5 This determination contradicted the decisions 
of two prior EPA general counsels.6 
 In response to this federal abandonment of the regulation of 
greenhouse gases, numerous states have taken the initiative in develop-
ing their own methods of regulating and reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.7 One of the most promising of these plans is the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a multi-state cooperative effort to 
establish a regional cap-and-trade program targeting CO2 emissions 
produced by fossil fuel-fired power plants.8 RGGI is currently in its early 
stages, and while seven states have signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) committing themselves to the program, the initiative 
will not become effective until 2009.9 Although this ambitious program 
is a promising sign that states are taking the threat of global warming 
seriously, RGGI is not without its potential problems. One of the possi-
ble roadblocks facing the initiative is the Compact Clause found in Ar-
ticle I of the U.S. Constitution.10 
 An interstate compact is a legally binding agreement between 
states, created when states pass reciprocal statutes.11 As compacts have 
become increasingly common, their relationship to the Compact Clause 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Lo-
cal and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate 
Change, 12 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 15, 26 (2004). 
4 In-Depth Special, Global Warming: U.S. Turns its Back on Kyoto, CNN.com, http://www. 
cnn.com/specials/2001/globalwarming/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Global 
Warming]. 
5 McKinstry, supra note 3, at 73–76. 
6 Id. at 75. 
7 Hodas, supra note 2, at 55 (“[A]s states have become frustrated with the failure of the 
Bush Administration [to deal with the threat of global warming, the] drumbeat from the 
states has become louder and more insistent.”); see McKinstry, supra note 3, at 26–54 (not-
ing greenhouse gas initiatives in California, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Wisconsin, and eastern Canada). 
8 See Conservation Law Foundation, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www. 
clf.org/programs/cases.asp?id=341 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter CLF, RGGI]; 
Conservation Law Foundation, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Background, http:// 
www.clf.org/programs/cases/asp.?id=340 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter CLF, 
Background]. 
9 CLF, RGGI, supra note 8. 
10 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress 
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
11 Paul T. Hardy, Interstate Compacts: The Ties That Bind 2 (1982). 
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has become the topic of significant debate.12 Although the plain lan-
guage of the Compact Clause suggests that all interstate agreements 
and compacts require congressional consent, the Supreme Court has 
not interpreted it that way.13 The Court has provided scarce precedent 
with respect to the congressional consent requirement, but it has 
adopted a standard under which only interstate compacts that increase 
state power at the expense of federal supremacy require congressional 
consent.14 The Court decided the controlling case, U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Commission, in 1978, and has rarely returned to this sub-
ject in the years since that decision.15 
 The issue RGGI faces under U.S. Steel is whether it increases the 
power of its member states against that of the federal government.16 In 
dicta, the Court seemed to suggest a three-part inquiry that would re-
sult in a compact’s falling outside the scope of the Compact Clause’s 
congressional consent requirement.17 Under this inquiry, an agreement 
will not require congressional consent if it: (1) does not authorize 
member states to exercise powers unavailable to them in the compact’s 
absence; (2) does not delegate sovereign power to the administrative 
body established by the compact; and (3) reserves in each state the 
power to withdraw from the compact at any time.18 These three charac-
teristics do not seem to constitute a determinative test, however, as the 
opinion does not suggest that agreements not marked by these traits 
necessarily require congressional consent.19 
 In its current iteration, RGGI is likely to satisfy this inquiry and 
thus avoid the Compact Clause’s congressional consent requirement.20 
However, if the member states decide to vest regulatory and enforce-
ment powers in RGGI’s administrative body, the outcome would likely 
be different.21 It is unclear how the Court would approach such an 
agreement in light of the Compact Clause.22 
                                                                                                                      
12 See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Michael 
S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 285 (2003). 
13 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 459, 471. 
14 See id. at 471. 
15 See Greve, supra note 12, at 287–88, 308. 
16 See U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471. 
17 See id. at 473. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. at 479. 
20 See  infra Part IV.A. 
21 See infra Part IV.B. 
22 See id. 
390 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:387 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Compact Clause 
and a brief history of interstate compacts. Part II details the Court’s 
holding in U.S. Steel Corp. Part III discusses the structure of RGGI and 
the reasons underlying its creation. Part IV explores RGGI’s likely status 
under U.S. Steel, both in its current form and in the likelihood of the 
initiative’s administrative agency being granted regulatory and en-
forcement powers. Part IV concludes that RGGI, in its current form, 
does not require congressional consent under U.S. Steel, but that an 
empowered administrative agency would likely change that conclusion. 
I. The Compact Clause and the History of Interstate Compacts 
A. The Compact Clause 
 The Compact Clause of Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress 
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.”23 This 
language suggests a virtual ban on agreements or compacts between 
states.24 However, the true meaning and scope of the Compact Clause 
has been the subject of debate for quite some time.25 The “broad and 
unqualified” language of the clause has resulted in much ambiguity 
concerning its purpose and reach.26 
B. An Overview of Interstate Compacts 
 A compact is “basically an agreement between two or more states, 
entered into for the purpose of dealing with a problem that transcends 
state lines.”27 Functioning simultaneously as contracts and statutes, 
these legally binding agreements come into existence when two or 
more states enact highly similar, if not identical, statutes that “establish 
and define the compact and what it is to do.”28 These statutes also serve 
                                                                                                                      
23 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Compact Clause is “the only provision of the U.S. 
Constitution that provides a mechanism for formal cooperation among states.” Hardy, 
supra note 11, at 2. 
24 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 459 (stating that, if read literally, the Compact Clause would 
require states to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among 
themselves); see Greve, supra note 12, at 297–98. 
25 Note, Charting No Man’s Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Doctrines to In-
terstate Compacts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 1992 n.11 (1998) (“Courts and commentators 
differ over how the scope of the clause was intended to be, or should be, limited.”). 
26 See Greve, supra note 12, at 297. 
27 Hardy, supra note 11, at 2. 
28 Id.; Note, supra note 25, at 1993; see Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democ-
ratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (1997). 
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as elements of a contract: the enactment of the compact statute by one 
state is the offer, and the passage of the same or an equivalent statute 
by the other states comprises the acceptance.29 Accordingly, courts in-
terpret compacts as both contracts and statutes, and they therefore 
must meet the legal requirements of both.30 They are binding on the 
signatory states to the same extent as contracts between individuals or 
corporations are on the parties involved.31 As such, “[a] transgressing 
state can be sued in federal court, with specific performance an avail-
able remedy.”32 In addition to being governed by contract law, com-
pacts are also subject to the same legal principles that govern statutory 
interpretation.33 
 The creation and design of interstate compacts has developed with 
little or no guidance from the federal or individual state constitutions, 
none of which contain procedural requirements that govern such 
agreements.34 Over time, however, the process for enacting contracts 
has remained mostly consistent.35 Generally speaking, the process “be-
gins with some form of negotiation between the states considering 
creation of and membership in the compact.”36 Eventually, the negoti-
ating states determine the purpose of the compact and the manner in 
which that purpose will be met.37 At the completion of the negotiation 
stage, the signatory states draft a document that lays out the ways and 
means by which the expectations established during the negotiations 
will be carried out.38 Then, each member state must ratify “the specific 
                                                                                                                      
29 Hardy, supra note 11, at 2; see Hasday, supra note 28, at 2 (“More than mere statutes, 
compacts are contracts that are binding on the member states and their citizens.”). 
30 See Note, supra note 25, at 1993; Hasday, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
31 Hardy, supra note 11, at 3. They are binding even to the extent that “a state may not 
withdraw from a compact on the ground that its highest court has found the agreement to 
be contrary to the state constitution.” See Hasday, supra note 28, at 3. 
32 Hasday, supra note 28, at 3. 
33 Hardy, supra note 11, at 3. Other terms of a compact would provide for “enactment 
and amendment, and procedures for termination or withdrawal.” Note, supra note 25, at 
1993. 
34 Hardy, supra note 11, at 6. See generally Frederick L. Zimmermann & Mitchell 
Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 16 (1961) (discussing generally 
the process of compact negotiation, enactment, and consent). Neither the records of the 
Constitutional Convention nor the Federalist Papers “furnish . . . light as to the source and 
scope of this compact provision.” Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause 
of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 694 (1925). 
35 Hardy, supra note 11, at 6. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. The negotiation process varies, depending on the compact. See Zimmermann & 
Wendell, supra note 34, at 16–19. 
38 Hardy, supra note 11, at 6. 
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document containing the provisions of the agreed-to compact.”39 This 
ratification process requires passage in the state legislature and the sig-
nature of the governor.40 
 The final step in the creation of some compacts—one that is only 
required in certain circumstances—is the obtainment of congressional 
consent.41 Historically, Congress has been willing to consent to com-
pacts “almost automatically.”42 The Supreme Court has held that Con-
gress may consent in advance to compacts, and will “imply consent 
from congressional action, making formation of a compact even eas-
ier.”43 However, Congress has the power to amend or terminate com-
pacts to which it has granted consent, giving it power markedly asym-
metrical to that of the states.44 Even more noteworthy, perhaps, is the 
fact that the Court has also imputed to Congress the right to grant 
conditional consent.45 Thus, when Congress does invoke its authority 
under the Compact Clause, it wields immense power over the proposed 
compact.46 
C. The Historical Development of Interstate Compacts 
 For many years, interstate compacts were rare; only twenty-one be-
came effective between 1789 and 1900.47 These early interstate com-
pacts were enacted almost exclusively for the purpose of defining state 
boundaries.48 This trend eventually changed, though, as “states began 
to recognize in the compact clause a tool for the resolution of other, 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. “Although recent data is sketchy, writers frequently cite studies indicating that 
compacts take between four and nine years to enact and lament that the states and Con-
gress have not been able to proceed more rapidly.” Hasday, supra note 28, at 19. Hasday 
argues, however, that the time-consuming nature of the compact negotiation process is not 
necessarily a flaw given compacts’ permanency. Id. at 20. 
40 Hardy, supra note 11, at 6. 
41 Note, supra note 25, at 1992–93. One commentator posits that the Compact Clause’s 
congressional consent requirement should be interpreted to apply to a far broader range 
of interstate agreements. See generally Greve, supra note 12. 
42 Hasday, supra note 28, at 14. 
43 Zimmermann & Wendell, supra note 34, at 21 (“Clearly, when a compact is brought 
before it for its consideration, Congress can indicate by a variety of means its legislative 
intent that consent is not necessary.”); Hasday, supra note 28, at 13 (noting, however, that 
although Congress can grant consent in advance, it rarely does so). 
44 Hasday, supra note 28, at 12. 
45 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 439–40 (1981); Hasday, supra note 28, at 14–16. 
46 See Hasday, supra note 28, at 12. 
47 Richard H. Leach & Redding S. Sugg, Jr., The Administration of Interstate 
Compacts 5 (1959); see Hasday, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
48 Note, supra note 25, at 1992. In fact, “all but one of the thirty-six compacts enacted 
before 1921” were devoted to boundary disputes. Hasday, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
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more complex, problems.”49 Rapid industrialization and the states’ in-
creasing interdependency led to a heightened desire for “improvisa-
tion, experimentation, and cooperation,” and compacts provided what 
seemed to be the answer.50 
 A prime example of this developing recognition of the benefits of 
interstate compacts was the establishment in 1917 of the Port Authority 
of New Jersey and New York.51 The Port Authority was created to “ad-
minister efficiently a multitudinous array of issues that confronted the 
Port of New York,” and the federal government accordingly delegated 
to it the power to regulate one of the most important harbors in the 
United States.52 After eighty years of feuding between the two states, 
only an interstate compact proved successful at bringing the two sides 
into agreement.53 This ceding of the federal government’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce heralded a new approach to compacts.54 
Inspired by the success of the Port Authority, other interstate compacts 
similarly unrelated to boundary disputes were enacted.55 
 This trend toward more frequent use of the Compact Clause to 
deal with increasingly complex interstate issues was accelerated by an 
influential article authored by Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis in 
1925.56 The authors wrote, “The imaginative adaptation of the compact 
idea should add considerably to resources available to statesmen in the 
solution of problems presented by the growing interdependence, social 
and economic, of groups of States forming distinct regions.”57 Using 
the issue of electric power as an example, the two authors strongly sug-
                                                                                                                      
49 Marlissa S. Briggett, Note, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 
18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 751, 757 (1991). “During the twentieth century . . . a revolu-
tion has occurred in the conception and so in the use of interstate compacts.” Leach & 
Sugg, supra note 47, at 6. 
50 See Greve, supra note 12, at 291–92. 
51 Briggett, supra note 49, at 757. 
52 Id. 
53 Leach & Sugg, supra note 47, at 7. 
54 See Briggett, supra note 49, at 758 (“The formation of the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey piqued interest in the interstate compact as an effective device for regula-
tion.”); see also Note, supra note 25, at 1992. 
55 See Leach & Sugg, supra note 47, at 7. For example, two subsequent—and success-
ful—interstate compacts were the Interstate Sanitation Commission (1935), and the Pali-
sades Interstate Park Commission (1937). Id. 
56 See Briggett, supra note 49, at 758 (referring to the significance of the “landmark” 
Frankfurter and Landis article). See generally Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 34. 
57 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 34, at 729; see Leach & Sugg, supra note 47, at 8–9 
(discussing the new light cast on interstate compacts by Frankfurter and Landis, and the 
subsequent shift in the prevailing wisdom regarding the scope and utility of compacts). 
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gested that compacts “furnish[] the answer” to such regional prob-
lems.58 
 This new view of compacts—that they are useful tools applicable 
in a wide range of different situations—resulted in a sharp spike in 
the number of compacts in force.59 From 1920 to 1940, the states 
adopted approximately twenty compacts.60 This trend continued into 
the 1970s, with over 100 compacts created between 1940 and 1975.61 
There are currently approximately 200 interstate compacts in effect, 
varying greatly with respect to their subject matter.62 
 Over time, compacts have evolved to serve three main functions.63 
As previously mentioned, the first of these functions is to resolve 
boundary disputes, an endeavor to which nearly all early compacts were 
committed.64 The second function involves institutionalizing one-shot 
interstate projects, such as the allocation of water resources or the 
building of a bridge.65 Finally, and of primary concern for this Note, 
“[some] compacts create ongoing administrative agencies with jurisdic-
tion over such varied and important domains as resource management, 
public transportation, and economic development.”66 The proposed 
RGGI discussed at length below is an example of this third category of 
interstate compacts.67 
 The history of interstate compacts shows an evolution from fairly 
simple tools used to resolve interstate boundary disputes to complex 
agreements dealing with a wide range of issues.68 Despite the promul-
gation of hundreds of these agreements over the last seventy-five 
                                                                                                                      
58 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 34, at 708. 
59 See Hardy, supra note 11, at 5; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 34, at 729; Hasday, 
supra note 28, at 4 n.18. 
60 Hardy, supra note 11, at 5. 
61 Id. 
62 Greve, supra note 12, at 288; see also Hasday, supra note 28, at 4 n.18 (noting that the 
pace of compact creation dramatically quickened in the twentieth century, but began to 
slow in the 1970s). Hardy provides a list of areas for which compacts have been created, 
including, among others: fisheries conservation, land and water resources, mining prac-
tices, corrections, educational facilities, mental health, taxation, vehicle safety, nuclear 
energy, pest control, parks and recreation, regional planning and development, mass tran-
sit, and flood control. Hardy, supra note 11, at 5. 
63 Hasday, supra note 28, at 3; see Leach & Sugg, supra note 47, at 5–6. 
64 Hasday, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
65 See id. at 4. Other examples of this type of compact are included in the Hasday arti-
cle. Id. at 4 n.16. 
66 Leach & Sugg, supra note 47, at 6; Hasday, supra note 28, at 4. 
67 See infra Parts II.B, III.A–B; see also Hasday, supra note 28, at 4 n.17. 
68 See Hardy, supra note 11, at 4–5; Greve, supra note 12, at 288; Hasday, supra note 28, 
at 3–4. 
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years, a major question mark still looms over this form of interstate 
problem-solving.69 Due largely to the fact that there is very little case 
law concerning interstate compacts, the issue of when congressional 
consent is required is the subject of much debate.70 
II. The Compact Clause, Congressional Consent, and the 
Court: Scant Attention and Scarce Precedent 
A. Precursors to U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission 
 Very few Supreme Court cases have dealt directly with the Com-
pact Clause, resulting in much uncertainty regarding the requirement 
that some interstate compacts be granted congressional consent before 
going into effect.71 A brief line of cases, culminating in U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Commission, is virtually all that exists of Court precedent 
regarding the congressional consent requirement.72 Some authors as-
sert that this scarce precedent makes the Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence ambiguous and perhaps unreliable.73 
 In Virginia v. Tennessee, an 1893 case involving a border dispute be-
tween the two states, the Court for the first time distinguished between 
interstate compacts that require congressional consent and those that 
do not.74 In dicta but writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Field de-
clared that the Compact Clause cannot be read to apply to all agree-
ments and compacts.75 Rather, he wrote: 
 Looking at the clause in which the terms “compact” or 
“agreement” appear, it is evident that the [clause’s] prohibi-
                                                                                                                      
69 See Greve, supra note 12, at 288 (noting the increase in the number of compacts 
formed, and highlighting the perceived complexities in their relationship to the congres-
sional consent requirement). 
70 See Greve, supra note 12, at 308 (pointing out that the controlling case on this sub-
ject has subsequently been neither questioned nor relied upon by the Court); Hasday, 
supra note 28, at 11 (stating that “[t]he jurisprudence on compacts is aged” and “this body 
of law is likely to be revisited”); Note, supra note 25, at 1992–93 (noting that original intent 
with respect to the Compact Clause is contested). 
71 See Greve, supra note 12, at 308; Hasday, supra note 28, at 11; Note, supra note 25, at 
1992–93. 
72 See generally 434 U.S. 452 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); 
Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
73 See Greve, supra note 12, at 308; Hasday, supra note 28, at 11; Note, supra note 25, at 
1992–93. 
74 See 148 U.S. at 518–19; Briggett, supra note 49, at 757–58 (“In Virginia v. Tennessee, 
the Supreme Court distinguished between compacts that do not encroach upon federal 
power and those that might interfere with federal power.”). 
75 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519. 
396 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:387 
tion is directed to the formation of any combination tending 
to the increase of political power in the States, which may en-
croach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the 
United States.76 
 Thus, according to Justice Field, there are two categories of inter-
state compacts.77 The first consists of compacts that increase the mem-
ber states’ political power vis-à-vis the federal government, and there-
fore require congressional consent under the Compact Clause.78 The 
second is comprised of those compacts that do not “encroach upon or 
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States,” and therefore 
do not require congressional approval.79 Justice Field proposed that the 
proper inquiry is whether “the establishment of the [compact] may 
lead or not to the increase of the political power or influence of the 
States affected, and thus encroach or not upon the full and free exer-
cise of Federal authority.”80 
 The next major case to deal directly with the congressional con-
sent requirement was New Hampshire v. Maine, decided in 1976.81 While 
that case’s subject matter is irrelevant to this discussion, the Court—in 
declaring that the agreement in question did not require congressional 
consent—utilized the language found in Virginia v. Tennessee regarding 
the two categories of interstate compacts.82 Justice Brennan, who au-
thored the opinion for a six-member majority, first quoted directly from 
the “just supremacy of the United States” language of Virginia v. Tennes-
see.83 Then, again quoting from Virginia v. Tennessee, he wrote that the 
outcome of Compact Clause cases depended upon whether the inter-
state agreement “may lead or not to the increase of the political power 
or influence of the States affected, and thus encroach or not upon the 
full and free exercise of Federal authority.”84 This decision represented 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 518–19. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 520. 
81 See 426 U.S. 363, 370 (1976) (finding that a consent decree regarding a border dis-
pute between the two states was not an agreement or compact under the Compact Clause 
and thus did not require congressional consent). 
82 New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. at 369–70; see Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519. 
83 New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. at 369 (“The application of the Compact Clause is 
limited to agreements that are ‘directed to the formation of any combination tending to 
the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with 
the just supremacy of the United States.’” (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519)). 
84 Id. at 369–70. 
2007] The Compact Clause & the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 397 
the first time that the Court had “occasion expressly to apply [Justice 
Fields’s language] in a holding [rather than in dicta].”85 Just two years 
later, the Court would deliver its most significant Compact Clause opin-
ion to date.86 
B. An Analysis of U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission 
 The last, and most important, of this line of Compact Clause con-
gressional consent cases was U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commis-
sion.87 Coming close on the heels of the Court’s opinion in New Hamp-
shire v. Maine, U.S. Steel stands as the most recent and most significant 
Court ruling regarding the Compact Clause.88 In the twenty-eight 
years since the opinion was handed down, the Court has rarely revis-
ited this area of law.89 
 At issue in U.S. Steel was the Multistate Tax Compact (Compact)— 
an agreement enacted by the legislatures of seven states—and the 
agency it created, known as the Multistate Tax Commission (Commis-
sion).90 In response to the difficulty member states encountered with 
respect to taxing multistate businesses, the Compact was formed to fa-
cilitate proper determination of the state and local tax liability of multi-
state taxpayers, promote uniformity and compatibility in state tax sys-
tems, facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of 
tax returns, and avoid duplicative taxation.91 The Commission, com-
                                                                                                                      
85 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1978) (referring 
to New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. at 369–70). 
86 See generally id. 
87 See id. at 454. 
88 See Greve, supra note 12, at 308. 
89 See id. The Court has subsequently dealt with the Compact Clause, but has not al-
tered its holding in U.S. Steel regarding compacts that do not require congressional con-
sent. Id. In fact, only two subsequent cases have dealt with U.S. Steel in any meaningful way. 
See, e.g., Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) (holding that an interstate agreement is 
federal law under the Compact Clause where Congress has authorized the states to enter 
into it and the subject matter of the agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional 
legislation); Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 
159 (1985) (holding that the agreement in question likely was not an interstate compact 
for purposes of the Compact Clause, and even if it were, it would not increase state power 
quoad the federal government). Northeast Bancorp is particularly pertinent to this Note be-
cause of the majority’s declaration that the agreement likely was not a compact to begin 
with, and even if it were, not all such agreements required congressional consent. See 472 
U.S. at 175–76. 
90 434 U.S. at 456. By the time the Court heard the case, twenty-one states had become 
members. Id. at 454. 
91 Id. at 456. 
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posed of the tax administrators from all member states, was created for 
the purpose of achieving these four goals.92 
 The Commission was endowed with “regulatory authority to de-
termine rules for the allocation and apportionment of business income 
among member states and other multistate tax issues.”93 This regula-
tory authority was subject to the member states participating in the 
proceedings in which the rules were determined, and to the states sub-
sequently approving the regulations.94 Furthermore, the Commission 
had the executive authority to conduct its own tax audits either of its 
own volition or upon request by a member state.95 The powerful Com-
mission also was granted “authority to adjudicate disputes, through 
compulsory arbitration, over the allocation of business income in dis-
putes between taxpayers and member-states’ tax authorities.”96 
 In response to this multistate tax scheme, several business interests 
sued in state and federal court to challenge the Compact’s constitu-
tionality under the Compact Clause.97 Before attacking the business 
interests’ substantive arguments, Justice Powell affirmed the Court’s 
prior holding in New Hampshire v. Maine establishing the test suggested 
in Virginia v. Tennessee.98 In dicta, he then offered what appears to be an 
informal three-part guide to determine whether a compact requires 
congressional consent: 
 On its face the Multistate Tax Compact contains no provi-
sions that would enhance the political power of the member 
States in a way that encroaches upon the supremacy of the 
United States. There well may be some incremental increase 
in the bargaining power of the member States quoad the cor-
                                                                                                                      
92 Id.; see Greve, supra note 12, at 303. 
93 Greve, supra note 12, at 303. 
94 Id. The regulations were to have “no force in any member State until adopted by 
that State in accordance with its own law.” U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 457. 
95 Greve, supra note 12, at 303. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. at 304. 
98 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471. Justice Powell wrote: 
In [New Hampshire v. Maine,] we specifically applied the [Virginia v. Tennessee] 
test. . . . We reaffirmed Mr. Justice Field’s view that the application of the 
Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are directed to the formation of 
any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, 
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States. This rule states the proper balance between federal and state power 
with respect to compacts and agreements among States. 
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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porations subject to their respective taxing jurisdictions. 
Group action in itself may be more influential than inde-
pendent actions by the States. But the test is whether the 
Compact enhances state power quoad the National Govern-
ment. This pact does not purport to authorize the member 
States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its ab-
sence. Nor is there any delegation of sovereign power to the 
Commission; each State retains complete freedom to adopt or 
reject the rules and regulations of the Commission. Moreover 
. . . each State is free to withdraw at any time. Despite this ap-
parent compatibility of the Compact with the interpretation 
of the Clause established by our cases, appellants argue that 
the Compact’s effect is to threaten federal supremacy.99 
Under this apparent test, an interstate agreement does not increase 
state power at the expense of federal power and thus does not require 
congressional consent if it: (1) “does not purport to authorize the 
member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its ab-
sence”; (2) does not delegate sovereign power to the administrative 
body created by the compact, allowing each state to retain “complete 
freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commis-
sion”; and (3) reserves in each state the power to withdraw from the 
Compact at any time.100 All of these factors contribute to a compact’s 
“apparent compatibility . . . with the interpretation of the [Compact] 
Clause established by [precedent].”101 
 After laying out this putative test in dicta, the Court proceeded to 
dismantle the specific challenges to the Compact’s legality.102 The first 
theory the appellants offered sought to limit the Virginia v. Tennessee 
rule to agreements that did not involve an independent administra-
tive body.103 However, the Court rejected this argument.104 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Powell stated, “It is true that most multilateral 
compacts have been submitted for congressional approval. But this 
historical practice . . . is not controlling.”105 Justice Powell declared 
that the pertinent inquiry is one of potential, not actual, impact on 
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. at 472–73. 
100 Id.; Greve, supra note 12, at 306–07. 
101 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. at 471. The argument was based on the fact that the Court had never upheld a 
multilateral agreement involving such a body without congressional consent. Id. 
104 Id. 
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federal supremacy.106 He noted that the number of parties to an 
agreement is irrelevant.107 Rather, all that matters is whether there is 
impermissible enhancement of state power vis-à-vis federal power.108 
 After rejecting the business interest appellants’ contention that the 
rule established in Virginia v. Tennessee should be limited, the Court dis-
pensed with the rest of their argument.109 The second theory behind 
the suit was that the Compact encroached upon the power of the fed-
eral government, and thus it required congressional approval.110 In 
making this argument, appellants offered three main contentions: 
(1) the Compact encroached upon federal supremacy with respect to 
interstate commerce; (2) the Compact encroached upon the power of 
the United States with respect to foreign relations; and (3) the Com-
pact impaired the sovereign rights of nonmember states.111 All of the 
appellants’ arguments were dashed by the seven-Justice majority.112 
 The first claim regarded the Compact’s purported interference 
with interstate commerce.113 The business interest appellants argued 
that the Compact affected interstate commerce in four ways.114 Two 
alleged effects on interstate commerce involved the risk of multiple 
taxation: first, a risk was allegedly created by the Commission’s audit-
ing techniques, and second, by its apportionment of nonbusiness in-
come.115 The third alleged effect on interstate commerce stemmed 
from the Compact’s requirement that multistate businesses under au-
dit file data concerning affiliated corporations, and the fourth was 
that the Compact conferred upon the Commission enforcement pow-
ers that exceeded the power wielded by each state acting individu-
ally.116 The Court rejected each of these claims, making the particular 
point of rejecting the claim concerning enforcement power.117 Justice 
Powell wrote, “Appellees make no showing that increased effective-
ness in the administration of state tax laws, promoted by [this recipro-
cal legislation], threatens federal supremacy.”118 In short, the Com-
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. at 472. 
107 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 472. 
108 Id.; see Greve, supra note 12, at 304. 
109 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 472. 
110 Id. at 473. 
111 Id. at 473–78. 
112 See id. at 479. 
113 Id. at 473. 
114 Id. at 473–76. 
115 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473–75. 
116 Id. at 475–76. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. at 476. 
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pact did not encroach upon federal power simply by increasing states’ 
ability to strengthen their own laws by way of cooperating with one 
another.119 
 The Court viewed the second argument with an equally critical 
eye.120 Appellants argued that the Commission “conducted multina-
tional audits . . . [which conflicted] with federal policy concerning the 
taxation of foreign corporations.”121 In sternly rejecting this argu-
ment, Justice Powell wrote, “To the extent that [the auditing method 
in question] contravenes any foreign policy of the United States, the 
facial validity of the Compact is not implicated.”122 
 The third and final Compact Clause argument offered by the 
business interests charged that the Compact impaired the sovereign 
rights of nonmember states.123 This contention was based on the belief 
that if the particular auditing methods employed by the Commission 
were to spread throughout the region, unfairness in taxation could 
only be avoided by way of a coordinating body.124 That coordinating 
body, argued appellants, would naturally be the Commission.125 Thus, 
they claimed, the Compact exerted “undue pressure to join upon 
nonmember States in violation of their ‘sovereign right’ to refuse.”126 
 The Court unequivocally—and rather aggressively—rebutted and 
rejected this line of argument.127 Justice Powell first pointed out that 
each member state was free to adopt the auditing procedures it 
thought best—the same situation that would exist had the Compact 
never been enacted.128 Furthermore, even if the Compact did create 
economic pressure, it was not an affront to state sovereignty.129 Justice 
Powell wrote, “Any time a State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy 
that affects the programs of a sister State, pressure to modify those 
programs may result.”130 As long as this pressure does not violate the 
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, he wrote, 
                                                                                                                      
119 See id. at 475–76. 
120 Id. at 476–77. 
121 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 476. 
122 Id. at 477 (noting further that “[t]his contention was not presented to the court be-
low and in any event lacks substance”). 
123 Id.; see Greve, supra note 12, at 305. 
124 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 477. 
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“it is not clear how our federal structure is implicated.”131 In essence, 
a compact does not impair the sovereign rights of nonmember states, 
and thus encroach upon the just supremacy of the United States, 
merely by virtue of the fact that it places one state at a disadvantage to 
another.132 
 As it stands now, U.S. Steel is the controlling case regarding the 
congressional consent requirement of the Compact Clause.133 Despite 
this stature, some commentators suggest that its hold on the congres-
sional consent requirement is tenuous.134 In light of the recent judicial 
shift in favor of state power, and the paucity of cases either supporting 
or questioning U.S. Steel since that opinion came down, “this body of 
law is likely to be revisited.”135 Until then, however, the congressional 
consent requirement is firmly under the sway of U.S. Steel. 
III. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
A. Why the Need for a Regional Initiative? 
 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) came about as a 
state response to inaction at the federal level regarding greenhouse 
gases, particularly CO2.136 Greenhouse gases, of which CO2 is the most 
prevalent, are so called because they trap the thermal radiation ema-
nating from the surface of the earth, resulting in global temperature 
increases.137 CO2 concentrations have increased by approximately 
thirty-one percent since the pre-industrial age, with electricity genera-
tors serving as one of the most significant contributors to the increase 
                                                                                                                      
131 Id. 
132 See id. Justice Powell also explained: 
Appellants do not argue that an individual State’s decision to apportion non-
business income—or to define business income broadly, as the regulations of 
the Commission actually do—touches upon constitutional strictures. This be-
ing so, we are not persuaded that the same decision becomes a threat to the 
sovereignty of other States if a member State makes this decision upon the 
Commission’s recommendation. 
Id. 
133 See Greve, supra note 12, at 308; Hasday, supra note 28, at 11. 
134 See Greve, supra note 12, at 308; Hasday, supra note 28, at 11. 
135 See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 178–79 
(2004) (noting the Supreme Court’s recent shift towards a more restrictive view of the 
federal government’s commerce power and a more expansive view of state autonomy); 
Hasday, supra note 28, at 11. 
136 See McKinstry, supra note 3, at 26 (“[M]any states, localities and private industry 
groups have taken action to fill the void left by the federal government.”). 
137 Scott, supra note 1, at 58. 
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in recent times.138 Despite this alarming trend, the federal govern-
ment has taken little action.139 
 Shortly after taking office in 2001, the Bush Administration made 
headlines the world over by declaring that it would not support U.S. 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol).140 The Protocol was nego-
tiated and signed by the parties to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (Framework Convention), which included 
the United States.141 Negotiated in 1998, the Protocol “defined the spe-
cific greenhouse gas emissions reductions required by the Framework 
Convention.”142 Though the Clinton Administration made the United 
States a signatory to the Protocol in 1998, it has never been ratified by 
the Senate, and the Bush Administration has made it clear that it does 
not support the measure.143 
 In 2003, several states “petitioned the EPA to list carbon dioxide 
. . . as a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act.”144 EPA declined, 
stating that it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the 
CAA.145 This determination was contrary to that made by two prior EPA 
general counsels.146 Indeed, the question of whether EPA has implied 
authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gases is “the subject of 
vigorous debate.”147 The CAA requires electricity generators to monitor 
and report their CO2 emissions, but does not directly control such 
greenhouse gas emissions or explicitly authorize such regulation.148 
                                                                                                                      
138 See Hodas, supra note 2, at 61 n.44; Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 2 (stating that 
electricity generators account for about one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions). 
139 See generally McKinstry, supra note 3. 
140 See generally Global Warming, supra note 4. 
141 McKinstry, supra note 3, at 17. The Framework Convention was the international 
community’s response to concerns about global climate change. Id. It was signed and rati-
fied by the United States in 1992, becoming effective in 1994. Id. The Convention “estab-
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143 See id. In explaining his rejection of the Protocol, President Bush cited what he saw 
as its high cost to American industry. Andrew E. Kramer, In Russia, Pollution Is Good For 
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less explicitly authorize [greenhouse gas] regulation.”). 
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 It seems, then, that “in terms of ambient air quality . . . the federal 
government has abandoned the field to the states.”149 There is cur-
rently no federal statute directly regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions.150 To fill this perceived gap in federal regulation, numerous states 
have taken the initiative against greenhouse gas emissions.151 Massachu-
setts, for example, has implemented mandatory CO2 emissions regula-
tions.152 These state initiatives, coupled with regional ones like RGGI, 
are attempts to make up for the federal government’s failure to ratify 
the Kyoto protocol or enact other meaningful CO2 restrictions.153 
B. The Initiative Itself 
 RGGI is an interstate agreement created for the purpose of re-
ducing emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel-fired power plants located 
within RGGI’s member states.154 Following on the heels of 2001’s Cli-
mate Change Action Plan—a groundbreaking (nonbinding) agree-
ment between the governors of the New England states and the pre-
miers of the provinces of Eastern Canada—RGGI is the first regional 
program of its kind.155 It is expected to result in notable decreases in 
CO2 emissions from power plants in the region.156 
 Currently, seven states have signed the Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) committing them to implementing RGGI.157 Those 
signatory states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.158 Two more states—Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island—were afforded the option of signing the MOU in 
the near future, while Maryland, the District of Columbia, Pennsyl-
                                                                                                                      
149 Hodas, supra note 2, at 74. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 55; see McKinstry, supra note 3, at 26–54 (detailing greenhouse gas initiatives 
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155 See id.; McKinstry, supra note 3, at 31. 
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vania, and the eastern Canadian provinces are considered “observers” 
in the process.159 
 The MOU obliges states to “propose for legislative and/or regu-
latory approval a CO2 Budget Trading Program . . . aimed at stabiliz-
ing and then reducing CO2 emissions within the Signatory States.”160 
Then, the states must “implement[] a regional CO2 emissions budget 
and allowance trading program that will regulate CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units” with a rated capacity not 
less than twenty-five megawatts.161 Stated plainly, RGGI’s purpose is to 
design a regional cap-and-trade program to reduce CO2 emissions in 
the signatory states.162 The seven states presently committed to the 
initiative plan to freeze power plant emissions at current levels and 
then reduce them by ten percent within ten years of the implementa-
tion of the initiative.163 This ambitious plan is a groundbreaking at-
tempt at using regional cooperation to take serious action against 
greenhouse gases.164 
 RGGI’s most significant goal is to “set up a market-driven system 
to control emissions of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, 
from more than 600 electric generators in the [seven] states.”165 It is 
to take effect in 2009, and aims to achieve its goal of a ten-percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2019.166 When the plan goes into force, 
it will be “the first mandatory cap-and-trade program in the United 
States to reduce emissions of the gases that cause global warming.”167 
Currently, the initiative is still in the development stage.168 
 To provide guidance in achieving its goals, RGGI mandates the 
creation of a regional organization (RO) to “facilitate the ongoing 
administration of the Program.”169 The RO, with its headquarters in 
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New York City, will act as a forum for the signatory states, develop, 
implement and maintain an emissions and allowance tracking system, 
provide technical support to the signatory states for the development 
of new offset standards, and provide technical assistance to the states 
in reviewing and assessing applications for offset projects.170 The RO 
will “have no regulatory or enforcement authority with respect the 
[RGGI],” as the signatory states retain such authority.171 An executive 
board, consisting of two representatives from each signatory state, will 
be tasked with overseeing the RO’s operations.172 To properly com-
plete its tasks, the RO “may employ staff and acquire and dispose of 
assets in order to perform its functions.”173 
 Once RGGI is in place, its founders hope that it will serve as a 
model for the rest of the nation.174 Already, the governors of California, 
Oregon, and Washington have come together to explore the creation 
of a similar cap-and-trade program for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, including perhaps those produced by motor vehicles.175 It is 
expected that if RGGI is successful, other such initiatives will follow.176 
 As details of RGGI are being finalized, one major consideration is 
its effect on energy prices and, accordingly, on consumers.177 While 
there is the possibility that the initiative will result in higher energy 
prices, officials hope those increases “can be offset by subsidies and 
support for the development of new technology.”178 The allowances 
and technology, it is anticipated, will be developed with funds raised 
from the sale of emissions allowances to the utility companies being 
regulated.179 
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IV. The Intersection of RGGI and the Compact Clause 
A. Does RGGI Require Congressional Approval Under U.S. Steel? 
 Under U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, the Compact 
Clause’s congressional consent requirement applies only to interstate 
agreements that are “directed to the formation of any combination 
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may en-
croach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States.”180 According to the Supreme Court, this rule “states the proper 
balance between federal and state power with respect to compacts and 
agreements among States.”181 Thus, the proper inquiry in determining 
whether RGGI requires congressional approval revolves around an 
analysis of its impact on federal power.182 A look at the federal govern-
ment’s hands-off approach to CO2 emissions and a close reading of U.S. 
Steel suggest that congressional consent is not required for RGGI.183 
 To begin this analysis, it is important to emphasize the federal 
government’s obvious and intentional avoidance of the issue of regu-
lating greenhouse gases, particularly CO2.184 In 2001, the Bush Ad-
ministration declared that it would not support U.S. ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol, a measure targeted at the control of greenhouse gas 
emission.185 The rejection came despite the fact that President Clin-
ton had signed the Protocol in 1998.186 This decision stands as evi-
dence that the federal government is not interested in exercising its 
power to regulate the greenhouse emissions targeted by RGGI.187 
 The federal government’s decision not to list CO2 as a CAA criteria 
pollutant further suggests a lack of interest in exercising regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
180 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). 
181 Id. 
182 See id. 
183 Aside from a direct application of U.S. Steel, there are other potential constitutional 
roadblocks to RGGI, including the Commerce Clause and federal preemption. See Greve, 
supra note 12, at 288. This Note, however, will deal solely with an application of RGGI to 
the facts and holdings of U.S. Steel. 
184 See McKinstry, supra note 3, at 26 (noting the “federal failure to implement the 
Framework Convention through ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and meaningful regula-
tory or fiscal policy”). 
185 Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern American Corporate 
Governance, 55 SMU L. Rev. 493, 510 (2002); Kevin Anderson, Bush Feels Heat on Global 
Warming, BBC NewsOnline, July 14, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 
1438089.stm. 
186 Sarah Krakoff, Essay, Arnold Schwartzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 
925, 928 (2005); McKinstry, supra note 3, at 17. 
187 See McKinstry, supra note 3, at 26. 
408 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:387 
power over this field.188 In declining to list CO2, EPA stated that it 
lacked the authority to do so under the CAA.189 While the CAA requires 
electricity generators to monitor and report their CO2 emissions, EPA’s 
decision not to list CO2 as a criteria pollutant suggests that the CAA 
does not currently control greenhouse gas emissions or authorize their 
regulation.190 This federal denial of authority to regulate CO2 emissions 
suggests that the current federal government is neither interested in, 
nor, in its view, capable of exercising power in this area.191 In short, “the 
federal government has abandoned the field to the states.”192 This 
abandonment is significant to RGGI’s likely treatment under U.S. 
Steel.193 
 Under U.S. Steel, the test for determining whether an interstate 
compact requires congressional approval revolves around whether or 
not it increases the states’ political power vis-à-vis the federal govern-
ment.194 In its current form, RGGI devotes itself exclusively to dealing 
with the problem of CO2 emissions generated by fossil fuel-fired elec-
tric plants.195 As such, it deals with an issue over which the federal 
government has expressly avoided exercising power.196 This suggests 
that the compact does not “tend[] to the increase of political power 
in the States” in such a way as to “encroach upon or interfere with the 
just supremacy of the United States.”197 
 The likelihood that congressional consent would not be required 
for RGGI is further supported by the text of the Court’s opinion in 
U.S. Steel.198 In dicta, the Court noted that the compact at issue “[did] 
not purport to authorize the member States to exercise any powers 
they could not exercise in its absence.”199 Next, the Court explained 
that there was no delegation of sovereign power to the commission 
created by the compact, as each state retained “complete freedom to 
adopt or reject the rules and regulations” of the commission.200 Lastly, 
it pointed out that each state had the power to withdraw from the 
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compact at any time.201 The Court intimated that all of these factors 
led to the compact’s “apparent compatibility . . . with the interpreta-
tion of the [Compact] Clause established by [precedent].”202 In light 
of the Court’s informal three-part inquiry into which interstate agree-
ments by definition do not require congressional consent, it seems 
even more likely that RGGI will not fall under the auspices of the 
Compact Clause’s congressional consent requirement.203 
 First, RGGI does not authorize the member states to exercise any 
powers they could not exercise in its absence.204 Due to the lack of clar-
ity regarding CAA’s authority over electricity plant-generated CO2 emis-
sions, the states may be free to regulate these emissions as they wish.205 
U.S. Steel suggests that the adoption of uniform standards “in accord 
with the wishes of the member States” does not amount to a violation of 
federal supremacy.206 Rather, adopting uniform regulations would lead 
to “increased effectiveness in the administration of” state CO2 emission 
regulations that would likely exist in the member states regardless of 
the existence of RGGI.207 Such “[r]eciprocal legislation” would merely 
serve “as a method to accomplish fruitful and unprohibited ends.”208 
 One such example is Massachusetts’s independent enactment of 
its own binding CO2 emissions regulations.209 These regulations man-
date that “any person who owns, leases, operates or controls an affected 
facility shall demonstrate that emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
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affected facility in the previous calendar year . . . did not exceed his-
torical actual emissions.”210 If Massachusetts becomes a signatory to 
RGGI, it will result in “increased effectiveness in the administration of” 
such preexisting regulations rather than an increase in its power vis-à-
vis the federal government.211 In short, RGGI would play the role of 
helping Massachusetts achieve “fruitful and unprohibited ends” that it 
would seek to achieve even in the absence of the agreement.212 
 Second, RGGI does not delegate sovereign power to the regional 
organization (RO).213 The MOU signed by the seven member states 
explicitly says that the organization “shall have no regulatory or en-
forcement authority with respect to the [RGGI], and such authority is 
reserved to each Signatory State for the implementation of its rule.”214 
Thus, while the RO is an important body in terms of its role in coor-
dinating the efforts of the signatory states, it in no way usurps their 
sovereign power.215 Each state clearly “retains complete freedom to 
adopt or reject the rules and regulations” of the RO and thus RGGI as 
a whole.216 This preservation of the signatory states’ individual sover-
eignty suggests that the initiative does not increase their power in re-
lation to the federal government under U.S. Steel.217 In short, the 
states are not collectively exercising any more power than they would 
be able to exercise individually.218 
 Finally, each signatory state has the power to withdraw from 
RGGI.219 According to the MOU, “[a] Signatory State may . . . withdraw 
its agreement . . . and become a Non-Signatory State.”220 In U.S. Steel, 
the Court suggested that such ability to withdraw was a factor in deter-
mining whether an interstate agreement requires congressional con-
sent.221 It is likely that this element of U.S. Steel’s apparent test for which 
interstate compacts do not require congressional consent is satisfied.222 
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 Thus, it is likely that under U.S. Steel, RGGI would not require con-
gressional approval.223 The agreement merely facilitates the effective 
administration of state regulations that would be legitimate in the ab-
sence of this agreement.224 Additionally, the states are not surrendering 
sovereign power to RGGI, because they reserve the right to adopt or 
reject the rules or regulations of the initiative.225 Furthermore, each 
signatory state has the right to withdraw from the compact.226 As such, 
it does not appear to “tend[] to the increase of political power in the 
States” in a way that interferes with the just supremacy of the United 
States.227 Cumulatively, these factors suggest that RGGI will not require 
congressional approval if analyzed under the Court’s holding in U.S. 
Steel.228 
B. What If the RO Is Given Regulatory and Enforcement Authority? 
 As the application of U.S. Steel to RGGI’s current iteration suggests, 
the agreement is not one that requires congressional consent.229 Sig-
nificant issues could arise, however, if steps are taken to make the 
agreement more binding on the signatory states.230 Specifically, if the 
RO were given actual authority over the member states, the agreement 
would be more likely to require congressional approval.231 
 Currently, the RO is destined to be a purely advisory body.232 It is 
tasked with four major duties, the first of which is to “[a]ct as the forum 
for collective deliberation and action among the Signatory States in 
implementing the Program.”233 Second, it must “[a]ct on behalf of 
each of the Signatory States in developing, implementing and main-
taining the system to receive and store reported emissions data.”234 
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Third, it must “[p]rovide technical support to the States for the devel-
opment of new offset standards to be added to state rules.”235 Finally, it 
is mandated to “[p]rovide technical assistance to the States in reviewing 
and assessing applications for offsets projects.”236 The advisory nature 
of these tasks, coupled with the MOU’s explicit declaration that the RO 
“shall have no regulatory or enforcement authority,” render the RO 
toothless.237 
 Should the signatory states find a need for a more aggressive and 
binding regulatory scheme, there exists the potential that the RO will 
be granted at least some form of regulatory and enforcement author-
ity.238 The MOU provides that the cap-and-trade program established by 
RGGI must be implemented in the signatory states under the force of 
statutory or regulatory law, but there is no guarantee that the states will 
act fairly and in good faith.239 Without an oversight agency vested with 
binding regulatory authority, it is easy to envision a change in a state’s 
leadership or economic circumstances leading to a drastically de-
creased effort in implementing and enforcing RGGI.240 Thus, for rea-
sons of stability and utility, it is possible that the signatory states will take 
this step at some point in the future to make RGGI more effective.241 
 If RGGI’s member states decide to create a more binding agree-
ment in which the RO would have regulatory and enforcement author-
ity over the member states, RGGI’s potential status under U.S. Steel may 
be greatly affected.242 Such a change would entail a power shift from 
the states to a multistate agency, an element that was not present with 
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respect to the compact at issue in U.S. Steel.243 This move would thus 
distinguish RGGI from the compact featured in U.S. Steel, increasing 
the likelihood of the Court requiring RGGI to seek congressional con-
sent.244 
 First, the granting of regulatory and enforcement powers to the 
RO would seem to “authorize the member States to exercise . . . powers 
they could not exercise in its absence.”245 For example, under such a 
scheme the signatory states could act together in using the RO as a 
mechanism for applying pressure to another member state.246 If a sig-
natory state were to provide lax enforcement and administration of 
RGGI, for instance, the other member states could conceivably compel 
the RO to take action against the transgressor.247 This process would 
clearly be an example of states exercising powers they could not exer-
cise in the absence of a compact, allowing them to use legal leverage 
that would not otherwise be available to them.248 It is difficult to envi-
sion one state, acting on its own, being able to wield such power over 
another.249 As this example makes clear, the RO’s potential possession 
of such enforcement power would involve far more than a group of 
states merely adopting reciprocal legislation to “accomplish fruitful and 
unprohibited ends.”250 Essentially, any time the signatory states’ repre-
sentatives to the RO’s executive board initiated regulatory or enforce-
ment action, they would be exercising power that would be unavailable 
to them in the absence of the compact.251 
 Second, and perhaps more important, vesting regulatory and en-
forcement authority in the RO would, by definition, involve a “delega-
tion of sovereign power” to that entity.252 By granting the RO the power 
to enforce the cap-and-trade program by way of its own binding regula-
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tions, the states would be acceding to a significant diminution of their 
sovereignty with respect to the regulation of CO2 emissions.253 This 
diminution of sovereignty would include “reduction in the state’s ability 
to act independently [in this area], a diversion of state funds and ener-
gies to interstate purposes, . . . and a reduction in administrative 
autonomy and authority.”254 Thus, the states no longer would “retain[] 
complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations,” as did 
the signatories to the compact at issue in U.S. Steel.255 Rather, they 
would be required to accept numerous binding rules and regulations 
to which they would not have acceded in the absence of the compact.256 
This requirement would clearly constitute a loss of sovereignty.257 
 The third part of the ad hoc test laid out in dicta in U.S. Steel, in-
volving member states’ ability to withdraw from the compact at any 
time, is more difficult to assess.258 Granting regulatory and enforce-
ment powers to the RO would not necessarily diminish the states’ abil-
ity to withdraw from the agreement.259 The MOU makes clear that any 
state can withdraw from the agreement, but it is conceivable—if not 
likely—that if RGGI were to take the next step and grant significant 
power to the RO, it would also take steps to make the signatory states’ 
involvement in RGGI more binding by way of a conventional contrac-
tual compact.260 In the absence of such steps to restrict member states’ 
ability to withdraw from the agreement, however, the argument could 
still be made that the empowered RO would diminish their freedom to 
withdraw.261 If a signatory state had been involved with RGGI for such a 
period of time that regulations promulgated by the RO had become 
entrenched in that state’s common practice, it would be considerably 
more difficult for the signatory state to disentangle itself from RGGI.262 
 If, as this analysis suggests, vesting regulatory and enforcement 
powers in the RO would lead to a considerable change in RGGI’s 
status under U.S. Steel, the question of its impact on federal supremacy 
remains unclear.263 The Court’s holding in that case was vague in 
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terms of addressing exactly what sort of agreements would increase 
state power versus federal power, thus requiring congressional con-
sent; all it provides is, in dicta, the ad hoc test mentioned above.264 It 
is not clear whether a compact’s running afoul of those three factors 
necessarily means that, as a rule, it would increase state power vis-à-vis 
the federal government.265 The Court made no mention of whether a 
compact that is not characterized by those three factors would neces-
sarily require congressional consent.266 If the RO were granted regula-
tory and enforcement power, RGGI would no longer be comparable 
to the compact in U.S. Steel, and it could be in a precarious position if 
challenged in court.267 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Compact Clause in Arti-
cle I of the U.S. Constitution to only require congressional consent 
for compacts that increase state power at the expense of federal su-
premacy. Compacts have evolved over time from typically dealing with 
interstate boundary disputes to involving much more expansive inter-
state agreements, sometimes including the creation of an administra-
tive body with regulatory and enforcement authority. The relatively 
recent increase in the number of compacts has not, however, resulted 
in a corresponding increase in judicial rulings on this subject. Cur-
rently, the controlling case is U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commis-
sion, which was decided in 1978. This area of the law has rarely been 
addressed by the Supreme Court since U.S. Steel. 
 RGGI is an interstate agreement among seven—and potentially 
more—northeastern states to establish a regional cap-and-trade pro-
gram regulating the emission of CO2 from fossil fuel-fired power plants. 
Formed in response to the lack of federal CO2 emissions regulations 
under the Bush Administration, RGGI has the potential to implicate 
the Court’s holding in U.S. Steel and the Compact Clause’s congres-
sional consent requirement. 
 In its current iteration, it is likely that RGGI will not require con-
gressional consent under a direct application of U.S. Steel. It does not 
appear likely that, when the initiative is fully implemented in 2009, it 
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will tend to increase state power versus that of the federal government. 
However, if RGGI vests regulatory and enforcement authority in its ad-
ministrative body, the outcome could be quite different. Existing Com-
pact Clause precedent allows for no more than venturing a guess as to 
how such a compact would fare. It does seem likely, however, that the 
empowering of the regional organization (RO) would cast RGGI out-
side the scope of the three-part inquiry suggested in U.S. Steel, leaving 
the initiative to drift into the relatively uncharted waters of the Court’s 
congressional consent requirement jurisprudence. 
